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Comparative Institutional Law and Economics:  
Reclaiming economics for Socio-Legal Research 
 
Law and economics is a controversial method of legal research, increasingly popular amongst 
some legal scholars but hated by many others. The author discusses some of the objections 
raised by lawyers (as well as some economists) and argues that most of these are caused by the 
employment of the wrong economics on the respective side of the conjoined field. She contrasts 
neoclassical economics, made extremely popular by the Chicago School and Prof. Richard 
Posner in particular, with the New Institutional Economics and argues that the latter can 
overcome the difficulties presented by the former. While neoclassical economics seems to 
introduce additional problems to legal scholarship, New Institutional Economics neatly 
matches law’s own methodological tenets. However, the analysis will remain incomplete unless 
a third element is added to the mix, Comparative law. Thus, she calls for the development of a 
Comparative Institutional Law and Economics which alone can be epistemologically 
satisfactory.  
 
The interaction of law with the social scientific discipline of economics has often caused 
tensions in the generalist legal community. Legal scholars frequently equate the application of 
economic theory to legal rules with ethical bankruptcy and dethroning law from its position of 
autonomous discipline. With its recommendations for market-based approaches and against 
state intervention law and economics is opposed by many on political grounds too. Economic 
analysis of law has also repeatedly been accused of disregarding the environment in which legal 
institutions are embedded and generating unworkable universal solutions. This has led to a cold 
acceptance of Law and Economics in Europe and to many legal scholars consciously eschewing 
the economic instrumentarium. In my view, while not without basis, the criticisms have largely 
resulted from a hasty and superficial engagement of the two disciplines. It is only one version 
of economics that is peddled by the Chicago School and that is admittedly the most common 
one, that can be blamed for complacency and universalism. The main purpose of this paper is 
to contrast this to a more sophisticated approach that is readily available but is little known 
outside of the ghetto reserved for economically minded lawyers. Thus, I shall show first that 
the New Institutional Economics (NIE) does not suffer from three major deficiencies that 
pervade the pervasive Posnerian analysis. Second, I will turn to NIE’s own limitations when 
applied to law. Further, I shall argue that good, sophisticated economic analysis requires 
rescuing the concept of efficiency from the grip of the universalistic neo-classical economics 
and infusing it with context by applying the comparative law and economics method. 
Combining New Institutional Economics and comparative law, this innovative interdisciplinary 
methodology is able to overcome the shortcomings of each of the disciplines taken separately 
and inject the field of law and economics with new analytical power. Thus, I shall propose the 
development of a Comparative Institutional Law and Economics approach which alone, I argue, 
enables analysis of legal phenomena which is sufficiently complex and subtle and yet grounded 
in social reality.  
 
A. Universality of Law and Economics 
 
It will not be wrong to say that to this day legal scholars, who are not themselves doing law and 
economics associate the economic ingredient of the discipline predominantly with the Chicago 
school of thought. In a way this is not surprising. It is the University of Chicago where it all 
started and it was Chicagoans that extended the application of law and economics to all areas 
 2
of life.1 In addition, the elegance and precision of Chicagoan models makes them attractive to 
policy-makers who naturally prefer clear-cut predictions and recommendations. The major 
contribution of the Chicago school is that it developed a systematic way of thinking of law 
reform that entails a steady application of a coherent body of economic theory (price theory) to 
legal rules. Where legal rules constitute prices of illegal conduct, they produce incentives to 
which rational individuals respond. Increase in the price, be it by providing for higher damages 
in case of tortious acts or breach of contract, or for heavier fines and longer jail time in case of 
criminal activity, would make illegal conduct more costly and incentivize actors to reduce it.2 
Structuring, then, legal rules in terms of the incentives they induce, we are able to affect human 
behavior in a way that would produce the desired result.3 This is the logic that is at the heart of 
the Chicagoan approach to law and economics. It will not be an overstatement to say that by 
methodically cultivating it, Chicagoans raised awareness about the consequences and trade-offs 
that follow from policy choices and opened the door to a better understanding of the relationship 
between the legal options on hand and the outcomes sought. 
 
Yet, while having attracted a large following, Chicagoan law and economics, has also drawn a 
great deal of criticism. Neoclassical economists view themselves as equipped with universal 
analytical tools that could be applied to any field.4 But while studying the phenomenon that has 
enticed their interest, they detach it from the particular background in which it operates. The 
concrete legal institution explored is largely isolated from the legal and social framework in 
which it is applied and is, instead, set in the theoretical construct of a perfectly competitive 
market. The latter inevitably comes with its basic and overly strong assumptions of well-defined 
rights and their complete enforcement as well as with the extreme focus on decentralized 
decision-making. The very emergence, the nature and the process of development of the rights’ 
structure is disregarded. If, after all, an important characteristic of the institutional context 
cannot be ignored, it is always positioned as an exogenous factor. As a result, the way the 
studied legal institution fits and interacts with others within the working of the larger system 
remains generally hidden from view. As for transaction costs, they are traditionally assumed to 
be zero. Even if they are introduced in the model, this is done only in a rudimentary fashion, 
without disciplined accounting for their source or nature. It is sufficient to look at the 
neoclassical models concerning contractual damages in which transaction costs are assumed 
only for the purpose of excluding renegotiation to realize that another vehicle through which 
particularities can enter the picture is completely underrated. With all possible complications 
tucked away, it comes as no surprise that neo-classical law and economics is capable of making 
bold claims as to universality of its solutions. 
 
In fairness, the mentioned features of neoclassical economic analysis of law should not be 
blamed only on the economics side of the discipline. The legal scholars, who embraced law and 
economics, did little to question the initial assumptions with which economists approached law. 
Usually US-trained, they directed their attention to the legal system they knew best and thus, 
showing no comparative interest, brought in tacit positivist postulates viewing law as a coherent 
product of one state and not as the messy social phenomenon it is. Such an implicit positivist 
                                                 
1 For example, the Nobel Prize laureate Garry Becker applies economic analysis to family relations. For a short 
history of Chicago Law and Economics, see Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema, Economics and the Law. 
From Posner to Post-Modernism and Beyond (Second edn, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 
2006) 94-102. 
2 Ibid 104. 
3 Ibid 104, 33. 
4 Law is hardly the only discipline that has seen the penetration of economic analysis. In political science, for 
example, economic analysis has been applied to non-market political decision-making to produce public choice 
theory. 
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outlook is underlain by the same assumption of fully defined rights and their enforcement 
without transaction cost limitations which is so typical of perfectly competitive markets.5 
Unspoken remnants of the positivist paradigm also positioned the American common law 
process as a naturally presumed setting, a setting that matched extremely well with the 
economic emphasis on decentralized decision-making. Thus, tacit legal assumptions, rooted in 
legal positivism, only reinforced the rigidities of economic theory. They have also fueled its 
universal ambitions. Failing to recognize the silent incorporation of local factors in the analysis, 
American law-and-economics scholars readily export US solutions to other legal systems. In 
this way law and economics is a meeting of two universalisms: the universalism of economics 
stemming from the creation of an ideal, yet virtual reality which is doubled up by the amplitude 
of American epistemic imperialism stemming from subconsciously operating positivist traces. 
 
This does not come to say that neoclassical economic models are useless. On the contrary, they 
represent important analytical and educational tools which provide essential information how 
behavioral incentives are affected by legal institutions and what are the trade-offs between 
stimulating one incentive or another. In my own research I myself have not simply ignored the 
received neoclassical wisdom.  On the contrary, I have spent a great deal of time and effort 
studying the effects generated by contractual damages and the way economists adapt this 
knowledge to other contractual remedies. Yet, my point is that the capacity of neoclassical 
economic models to evaluate legal institutions in terms of their incentive effects is also the outer 
limit of their universal claim. Once this limit is reached it is necessary to step into the real world 
since much of the insight can be gained not by keeping hold of the models but by examining 
the imperfect environment and its particularities.  
 
Yet law and economics has experienced considerable branching out and it is by no means 
mandatory that economic analysis be based on neoclassical economics.6 Neither is it inevitable 
that the analysis is affected by residual positivist biases deeply ingrained in legal thinking. Thus, 
I advocate the employment of a comparative law and economics method which joins New 
Institutional Economics and Comparative Law. I shall focus on the economic element first, and 
turn to the legal side in the section that follows.  
 
 
B. New Institutional Economics 
 
Three differences between the Chicago tradition and New Institutional Economics speak in 
favour of the latter school when applying economic analysis to law: first, the degree of realism 
achieved by economic analysis; second, the more subtle position taken with regard to the 
deregulation/regulation debate; and third, the developed dynamic framework.7  These 
methodological differences turn out to be not negligible at all as they lead to a different 
understanding of efficiency and to the specific take comparative law and economics has on the 
standard. 
 
                                                 
5 In a similar vein, see Antonio Nicita and Ugo Pagano, ‘Law and Economics in Retrospect’ in Éric Brousseau and 
Jean-Michel Glachant (eds), New Institutional Economics: A Guidebook (First edn, Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press 2008) 
6 Mercuro and Medema distinguish Chicago Law and Economics, Public Choice Theory, Institutional Law and 
Economics, New Institutional Law and Economics, New Haven School, Modern Civic Republican School. 
Mercuro and Medema. In addition, Behavioural Law and Economics took off during the 1990's of the last century. 
7 On the fundamental building blocks of the Chicago approach and of New Institutional Economics, see Mercuro 
and Medema 102-126; 241- 276. 
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1. The Degree of Realism 
 
By relying on very strict premises the Chicago approach created a sort of "economic nirvana"8 
which, according to Ronald Coase, has little to do "with what happens in the real world."9 In 
this approach, individuals, being rational maximisers of their satisfaction, respond, in the 
context of perfect markets, to price incentives embedded in the legal rules, the latter devised 
with an efficiency purpose. Although wealth-maximisation and the means to achieve it lie also 
at the core of New Institutional Economics10 the latter has moved well beyond the neoclassical 
and even the post-neoclassical paradigm. First, the introduction of the concept of transaction 
costs to economic analysis11 pointed at the illusory comfort of the world in which mainstream 
economists lived – an ideal world in which there are no costs of search, negotiation, monitoring 
and enforcement.12 However this may be not the radical departure that it seems to be as post-
Chicago scholars are also aware of the importance of transaction costs and the need to take 
economic thinking beyond the idea of perfect markets.13 Second, the assumption of full 
rationality is relaxed in order to base the new institutional analysis on the concept of bounded 
rationality.14 Again, some post-Chicagoans also realise the need to integrate a more realistic 
model of behaviour in their approach.15 The true progress made by New Institutional 
Economics, I think, is rooted in the way the analysis proceeds that makes it less abstract and 
more sensitive to the actual facts. It takes the concept of transaction costs seriously, viewing 
them not merely as barriers to exchange to be eliminated but as the product of the particular 
institutional arrangements in the specific context which themselves need to be analyzed. 
 
At the beginning of the analysis is always the Coase theorem.16 In a world of zero transaction 
                                                 
8 Nicita and Pagano. 
9 Ronald Coase, ‘The New Institutional Economics’ (1998) 88 The American Economic Review 72, 73. For the 
debate between Coase and Oliver Williamson, on one side, and Richard Posner, on the other side, see Richard 
Posner, ‘The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics’ (1993) 149 Zeitschrift für die 
GesamteStaatswissenschaft (Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics) 73; Ronald Coase, ‘Coase on 
Posner on Coase: Comment’ (1993) 149 Zeitschrift für die GesamteStaatswissenschaft (Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics) 96; Oliver Williamson, ‘Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and 
Economics’ (1993) 149 Zeitschrift für die GesamteStaatswissenschaft (Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics) 99; Ronald Coase, ‘Concluding Comment’ (1993) 149 Zeitschrift für die GesamteStaatswissenschaft 
(Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics) 360. 
10 Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 The Journal of Law and Economics 1; Oliver Williamson, 
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (New York: Free Press, London: 
Collier Macmillan 1985) 23. 
11 Ronald Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4 Economica 386; Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’. 
12 Ronald Coase, The Firm, the Market and the Law (First edn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1988) 7. 
13 See e.g. Charles Goetz and Robert Scott, ‘The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual 
Obligation’ 69 Virginia Law Review 967. 
14 Herbert Simon, Administrative Behaviour (Second edn, New York: Macmillan 1961) 24. Some new institutional 
economists even strive to go beyond the concept of bounded rationality. Exploring how humans decipher the 
environment through pre-existing mental constructs, they aim at explaining the institutional choices made and the 
effect of these choices on the economy. Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and  Economic 
Performance (First edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990); Douglass North, ‘Prologue’ in John 
Drobak and John V.C. Nye (eds), The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics (First edn, San Diego: 
Academic Press 1997) 11. In this aspect the new institutional economic literature intersects with experimental-
behavioural law and economics.  
15 Eric Posner, ‘Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure’ (2003) 112 The Yale 
Law Journal 829 865-868, 875-877. To be more correct, although Erik Posner is conscious of problems with the 
rationality assumption, he is also very sceptical of the capacity of bounded rationality models to better inform 
economic analysis of contract law. 
16 In fact, Coase himself did not explicitly state the Coase theorem. It can be induced from Coase, ‘The Problem 
of Social Cost’. 
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costs, law does not matter since parties will always bargain for the one efficient outcome. Our 
world, however, is a world of positive transaction costs and in it, law has important efficiency 
implications.17 In the imperfect human universe parties will bargain not until the right reaches 
its most valued user but until the expected gains exceed the expected costs. So how the 
particular right is initially assigned determines its final place. For the law to be efficient, it 
should structure property rights in a way which minimises transaction costs and maximises 
society's wealth.18 So far, so good; Chicagoans and New Institutionalists would not, I think, 
disagree on this.19 But what are the concrete steps to be taken in the process of finding the 
efficient legal solutions? Here is where the most significant differences start.  
 
The logic of the Chicago analysis roughly proceeds as follows: An optimal model is 
constructed under the assumption of zero transaction costs. The hypothetical legal rule 
enabling the parties to achieve the outcome in the optimal model is identified. The existing 
legal rule is then compared to the optimal one: if it is the same, the effective law is efficient; 
if it differs, then it is criticised as a rule that does not lead to an optimal result and, therefore, 
should be changed. The exercise may also include changes in the assumptions of the zero-cost 
model to discern different rules that are efficient under different conditions. Then again it will 
be seen whether the real-life rule fits any of the efficient ones.20 New Institutional Economics, 
however, sets on a different route of analysis: The different real-life institutional solutions to 
a problem are identified. Then the particular institutional framework is investigated in order 
to discover the factors determining transaction costs and the types of transaction costs 
associated with each of the solutions. Further, the different institutional arrangements are 
compared in terms of costs. The appropriate institution then becomes the one that implies the 
lowest level of transaction costs.21  
 
Obviously, both schools aim at getting as close as possible to the zero-transaction-cost world. 
Why then is the methodological procedure of New Institutional Economics to be preferred? 
The problem with the Chicago approach is the continuous, invariable emphasis on the optimal 
model. In the Chicagoan vision, the ideal world should be approximated by imitation, by 
replicating it as if it actually exists. If parties cannot reach the efficient allocation of property 
rights as a result of transaction costs, the law should help them attain the outcome as if there 
were no barriers to exchange. Costs are minimised by assuming zero costs and assigning rights 
and liabilities as if this assumption were correct. The rights go to the party that would have 
purchased them as the highest value user; the liabilities go to the party that would have 
assumed them as the least cost avoider.22 Yet, the assumption is not correct since no matter 
how much transaction costs are reduced, they are never completely eliminated and there will 
                                                 
17 It is often the case that only one of the assumptions, on which the Coase theorem rests, is emphasised – that of 
zero transaction costs (including information costs). For this reason it will be useful here to recall the other two 
assumptions which are just as important: (1) that the rights over the resources are fully defined, and (2) that the 
legal rights are alienable. Mercuro and Medema 110, 113. For more on these two assumptions, see infra Section 
C. 
18 This is known as the Coase lesson. For a detailed proof and interpretation of the Coase theorem, see ibid 107-
119. 
19 For this reason Coase is considered a founding father of both schools. It is also for this reason that Mercuro and 
Medema view New Institutional Economics as being in many respects consistent with the Chicago approach. Ibid 
243. 
20 For a similar description of the Chicago thinking, see Posner, ‘Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three 
Decades: Success or Failure’ 833-834. 
21 This rough description is distilled from the methodological account in Chapter 1 Transaction Cost Economics 
of Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. 
22 The same reasoning stays behind the efficient breach principle under which the promisor should be allowed to 
breach the contract if the gains from the breach exceed the costs. 
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always be costs of defining and enforcing property rights.23 We simply cannot arrive at the 
ideal world by imagining we are actually there. 
 
New Institutionalists, on the other hand, have accepted that this is unfeasible, so the emphasis 
is on where we are now, not on where we want to be. They study existing alternative 
governance institutions and aim at economising on transaction costs by endorsing the 
institution which governs exchange at the lowest cost level. Saving takes place not by 
mechanically reproducing the situation parties would be in if transaction costs were absent but 
by choosing the real-life workable arrangement that is the most cost advantageous. Moreover, 
as transaction costs depend on the particular institutional framework, the recommended 
solution is also determined with regard to the specific context. In this way, New Institutional 
Economics moves away from the "economic nirvana" and adopts an analytical technique that 
enables more accurate conclusions. 
 
In other words, although neoclassical economic models are educational if one wants to view 
legal rules in instrumental terms, it is important not to forget that they are only normative 
constructions that largely assume a non-existent state of the world. Often, they leave out 
important variables either because the latter do not appear as crucial within the ideal world, or 
because the scholar is focused on coming up with clear-cut recommendations. Other, more 
sophisticated models include the relevant variables but can lead to definite conclusions only if 
there is statistical data which can be punched into the model to make it operative.24 In contrast, 
New Institutional Economics investigates in detail the sources of transaction costs in particular 
contexts and attenuates the quantification difficulty by comparing the costs of diverse 
institutions. Instead of being paralysed by the absence of data on the amount of costs, it draws 
conclusions from their difference. This is how lawyers, without being too much preoccupied 
with computation problems, can make a substantial contribution in this analytical procedure 
as they are well-trained to recognise the transaction costs depending on the national legal 
system.  
 
2. The Position in the Deregulation/Regulation Debate 
 
The Chicago school invariably insists on the necessary connection between efficiency and the 
market. If the efficient allocation of property rights can be reached by parties' contracting, the 
reasoning goes, the law should facilitate exchange by providing for maximum tradability of 
property rights at low cost. It should ensure the conditions for achieving the efficient outcome 
by excluding any restrictions on freedom of contracting and by "mimicking the market". Such 
an interpretation of the Coase theorem is easily translated into the normative recommendation 
of minimum regulation. Public regulation is viewed as an additional source of transaction 
costs, obstructing the operation of competitive markets and generated, among other things, by 
regulatory capture.25 To this prescription also contributes the view of the efficiency of common 
law (broadly understood as judge-made law).26 According to Posner, the common law 
                                                 
23 Steven Cheung, ‘On the New Institutional Economics’ in Steven Cheung (ed), Economic Explanations: Selected 
Papers of Steven Cheung (First edn, Hong Kong: Arcadia Press Ltd. 2005) 248-250; Robert Cooter and Thomas 
Ulen, Law and Economics (Fifth edn, Pearson/Addison-Wesley 2008) 94; Robert Cooter, ‘The Cost of Coase’ 
(1982) 11 Journal of Legal Studies 1 11. 
24 See in this sense Posner, ‘Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure’. 
25 George Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2 The Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science 3. 
26 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (First edn, Boston: Little, Brown 1972); George Priest, ‘The 
Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Legal Rules’ (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 65; Paul 
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incentivises players to "channel their transactions through the market" or, in case of high 
transaction costs, simply reproduces the outcome that would have been obtained, had costs not 
impeded market operation.27 Its efficient legal doctrines make state intervention through 
statutory regulation unnecessary, all the more that the legislative process does not have the 
means to produce efficient results, whether these means are the party's choice between 
settlement and adjudication,28 an evolutionary mechanism, driven by the utility-maximising 
decisions of litigants,29 or the utility function of judges as determined by the institutional 
structure of the adjudicative system.30 In short, the decentralised decision making of the free, 
self-correcting market generates efficiency and if a market failure occurs, it is sufficient to rely 
on the common law to bring about the efficient outcome. 
 
Such a view, however, does not accord well with the mounting evidence suggesting an 
increasing regulatory role of private law. Truly, this evidence suggests a diminishing 
importance of public regulation but, still, it also implies that the market does not always 
function efficiently and that market failures need correction. It entails a trend from a command-
and-control to incentive-based regulation, not a trend toward deregulation as advocated by the 
Chicago school. From the above short account of the Chicagoan viewpoint it is clear that the 
origin of the market bias lies in the way Chicagoans construe the Coase lesson. In their view, 
the role of law should only be to define property rights and to assign them to the party who 
values them most since this would be the result from the market operation in the zero-
transaction-cost world. Yet, as explained, such a laissez-faire attitude would lead to efficiency 
only if it actually brings about the ideal world, an outcome that is highly unlikely.31  
 
The source of market favouritism, however, can also be found in the natural law model of 
property rights which is at the basis of neoclassical economics. This is the model on which 
Adam Smith, defying mercantilism, grounded his theory of the invisible hand.32 Setting out to 
formalise Smith's doctrine, the Chicago school embraced the natural law definition of property 
rights, implying a sovereign dominion of the individual, in which he is free from any 
government intervention and has an unrestricted bundle of rights over certain resources 
                                                 
Rubin, ‘Why Is the Common Law Efficient?’ (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 51; John Goodman, ‘An Economic 
Theory of the Evolution of Common Law’ (1982) 7 Journal of Legal Studies 393.  
27 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Fourth edn, Boston: Little, Brown 1992) 252.  
28 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’; William Landes, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Courts’ (1971) 14 Journal 
of Law and Economics 61. 
29 Rubin; Priest. 
30 Richard Posner, ‘What Do Judges Maximise (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does)’ (1993) 3 Supreme Court 
Economic Review 1. 
31 For such an argument, see also Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, ‘Labour Law and Economic Theory: A 
Reappraisal’ in Gerrit De Geest, Jacques Siegers and Roger van den Bergh (eds), Law and Economics and the 
Labour Market (First edn, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 1999); Simon Deakin, ‘Law versus Economics? 
Reflections on the Normative Foundations of Economic Activity’ in Megan Richardson and Gillian Hadfield (eds), 
The Second Wave of Law and Economics (First edn, Sydney: The Federation Press 1999). 
32 Smith's Wealth of the Nations was a reaction against the mercantilist policies dominating at the time. Under 
them the State, enacting many protectionist command-and-control regulations, became deeply involved in the 
economy. At that time the natural law framework was already introduced in England by Sir William Blackstone. 
William Blackstone, Sir, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol 4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1765-1769). In 
Smith's view, a property rights structure such as the one delineated in the natural law model, made the heavy 
government intervention, advocated by mercantilists, unnecessary, as the invisible hand of the free market would 
automatically channel the efforts of self-interested individuals toward socially desirable ends. Adam Smith, An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of the Nations (First edn, 1776), available at: 
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/3300. For a more detailed interpretation of the historical context in which Adam 
Smith developed his invisible hand doctrine, see Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (First edn, Ann 
Arbor: The University of MIchigan Press 1997) 40-46. 
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(property). Developed by civil lawyers, the natural law concept was divorced from the idea of 
obligation, necessary to control externalities, and any property right limitation was equated 
with limitation to freedom. Such absolute property rights were to be assigned by private law 
with any constraints contained only in public law regulation.33 This model remained largely 
an intellectual product and never underlay in its pure form the property rights structure in any 
legal system.34 Yet, it became the background against which mainstream law and economics 
developed its theory, placing great emphasis on the free market and perceiving any restraint 
on it as exogenously imposed.35  
 
Even after Coase had reconnected property rights and liability,36 mainstream economists did 
not re-examine the property right concept which continued to encompass a zone of "liberty 
over things" and to disregard the fact that in any legal system right-holders also have 
obligations.37 Searching for new methods to fill the void opened by Legal Realism38 many US 
legal scholars adopted economic insights without critically questioning them. Economic 
theoretical concepts were espoused without explicitly dispelling the natural law assumption, 
but as Coase had opened the door to real-world legal institutions, the analysis was directed to 
US law. Thus, the deregulation ideal backed by the natural law model, received a new support 
by the institutional structure of the American legal system which allots an important role to 
courts and much less faith in centralised decision-making. In this sense, the already existing 
misconception was not dismissed but another layer of confusion was added – the home country 
bias, the latter, as already explained rooted in unabandoned, tacitly operating legal positivist 
postulates.39  
 
Nevertheless, Coase's "The Problem of Social Cost" paved the way for a genuine shift in the 
way legal-economic analysis is carried out. Coase rejected the zero-transaction-cost world as 
an ideal place in which the absence of costs makes any institutions, even markets, useless.40   
Bringing actual, existing law into the analysis, he made the first step of moving away from the 
natural law model, which is at the root of economic theory. In addition, his account showed 
that along with the ex ante centralised model of regulation, the only one imagined by 
economists until then, there exists a functionally equivalent ex post decentralised model, 
operating through the imposition of remedies in private causes of action.41 Truly, the shift in 
the established paradigm turns out to be long and difficult since the Coase theorem continues 
                                                 
33 On the natural law model in civil law, see Mattei 33-38. 
34 Although influential, the model was subsequently challenged and discarded by civil lawyers. Ibid. In the 
common law tradition, it found its way in scholarly writings, particularly in Blackstone's Commentaries, but was 
never adopted by common law judges. Consequently, it never infiltrated the very roots of the legal system. On the 
common law model, see Mattei 39-40.  
35 For a more elaborate account of the natural law misconception in neoclassical economics, see Mattei Chapter 2 
The Economist's Legacy to Law and Economics: The Natural Law Misconception in Historical and Comparative 
Perspective 27-67. 
36 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’. 
37 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (Sixth edn, Boston: Pearson Education, Inc. 2012) 73-74.  
38 On the disillusionment with law's autonomy caused by Legal Realism and the growth of numerous ''law and'…" 
movements as a search for means to re-legitimate law, see Mercuro and Medema 14-19. For a similar argument, 
see also Mattei 57.   
39 See supra Section A. For more on the home country bias underlying law and economics, see infra footnote 87 
and the text accompanying it in Section C. 
40 Coase, The Firm, the Market and the Law 7. "The world of zero transaction costs has often been described as a 
Coasean world. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is the world of modern economic theory, one which I 
was hoping to persuade economists to leave." ibid 174. 
41 Later Williamson directed the attention also to private regulation. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of 
Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. 
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to be misread as ruling out state intervention.42 One reason for this is that New Institutionalists 
have not yet come up with a theory on the choice between public and private law.43 But they 
have made a great progress in digging out the options of institutional control available in 
different contexts and retreating from the automatic universal recommendation that the market 
should be left to do its job.  
 
What makes New Institutional Economics valuable for the economic analysis of law is its 
premise that the institutional framework, of which the legal framework is a part, matters for 
economic performance.44 Institutions determine the level of transaction costs both at the micro-
level of contracting between private parties and at the macro-level of the economy as a whole.45 
When talking about efficient markets, the logic unfolds, economists already assume a complex 
set of institutions which on balance promote the efficient operation of the market.46 That is, 
the market is not efficient per se, its efficiency depends on the institutional structure, so 
improvement in economic performance requires investigation of the way different institutional 
frameworks enhance efficiency.47 In this analysis the optimal, though not perfect solution may 
be provided by whatever real-life arrangement is found to exist: ex ante or ex post; statutory 
law, judge-made law or private ordering; or any combination between them. In this sense, in 
the world of transaction costs, market solutions are only one of the possible alternatives among 
others, with the range of possibilities including command-and-control as well as responsive 
regulation.48 The superiority of any alternative can be claimed only after careful comparative 
institutional analysis revealing the pros and cons of each of the options.49  
Separate from the market, efficiency becomes a theoretical concept dependent on the particular 
institutional context. With law being a vital part of this context,50 a legal researcher may 
proceed with her mind clear and eyes wide open about comparing different legal institutions 
in different jurisdictions. Yet, as there is not one single efficient solution, it cannot be said 
from the outset which country's legal institutions are more efficient. Such a conclusion requires 
an in-depth examination of the types of transaction costs generated by the legal-economic 
environment in each jurisdiction. What is more, as efficiency no longer constitutes an absolute 
yardstick for comparison, recommendations will probably differ with regard to each of the 
countries on a case by case basis. Thus, the higher subtlety of the positive institutional analysis 
will most probably lead to more subtle and dissimilar normative prescriptions.51 
                                                 
42 Cooter called the confusion about the generalisations which follow from the Coase theorem "the cost of Coase". 
Cooter, ‘The Cost of Coase’. 
43 Thomas Ulen, ‘The Future of Law and Economics’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio Nicita and Ugo Pagano (eds), 
Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions (First edn, London and New York: Routledge 2007) 33. 
44 Institutions constitute "the rules of the game in a society", they are "the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction" by structuring "incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic". North, 
Institutions, Institutional Change and  Economic Performance 3. 
45 Ibid 61-69. 
46 Ibid 64-66. 
47 See also for such an understanding of the New Institutional Economics theory Mercuro and Medema 241-245. 
48 For such an interpretation of the Coase theorem see Deakin, ‘Law versus Economics? Reflections on the 
Normative Foundations of Economic Activity’; Deakin and Wilkinson, ‘Labour Law and Economic Theory: A 
Reappraisal’. 
49 In this respect Coase was most explicit. See Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ 18-19; Coase, The Firm, the 
Market and the Law 117-118; Ronald Coase, ‘Law and Economics and A. W. Brian Simpson’ (1996) 25 Journal 
of Legal Studies (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, January 1996) 103. 
50 Institutions include formal rules (constitutions, laws, regulations) and informal constraints (conventions, norms 
of behaviour, self-imposed codes of conduct). North, Institutions, Institutional Change and  Economic 
Performance 4. 
51 This account of the advantages of New Institutional Economics, of course, does not mean that all research, which 
builds on the claim that institutions matter and uses inter-jurisdictional comparative analysis of legal institutions, 
automatically avoids all theoretical and methodological problems. Thus, the studies associated with the New 
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3. The Dynamism of the Framework  
 
Chicago legal-economic analysis is remarkably static.52 With models omitting the dynamics 
of the economic and the legal system, neoclassical theory is able to draw a picture concerning 
only a particular point of time. Relying solely on an ex ante comparison between the costs and 
benefits of the introduction of a rule, the Coase model also misses the dimension of legal-
economic change. Thus, for example, a legal rule compensating externalities may preclude the 
rise of welfare-enhancing business in the short run, but in the long run it may encourage 
competitors to search for innovative, less harmful ways of production, thus actually increasing 
well-being.53 Trying to develop a long term vision, in the 1970's and 1980's of the 20th century, 
the Chicago school advanced a hypothesis which saw the development of common law as a 
steady evolution toward efficiency.54 However, empirical time-series studies have already 
produced evidence that does not sustain this hypothesis in the commercial area.55 
 
With regard to the development of a dynamic theory, New Institutional Economics has set foot 
on a much firmer ground. The theory is built on a model of institutional change, which New 
Institutionalists see primarily as an incremental process, though change in a discontinuous 
manner is not excluded, either.56 In the model, law is no longer some exogenous, human 
addition to the market, the latter appearing as an ever-existing divine creation. On the contrary, 
both law and the market are institutions which, set in a larger and complex institutional 
environment, evolve together, each exerting pressure on the other and affecting its 
                                                 
Comparative Economics school have been subjected to fierce criticism from the legal community. Using statistical 
methods, the Legal Origins strand of New Comparative Economics seeks to assert a clear link between the origins 
of a jurisdiction's legal system, on one side, and, on the other side, the content and enforcement of its legal rules, 
as well as its economic performance. The large-scale studies offer far-reaching conclusions that do not discriminate 
between origin and recipient countries or between the ways in which legal transplantation has taken place 
(involuntary imposition, voluntary emulation, etc.). That is, although on the face the Legal Origins theory 
recognises the importance of institutions for economic growth, it seems to proceed on the basis of the assumption 
that the disparate institutional environment makes no difference with regard to the effects of transplanted legal 
institutions. The Institutional Possibilities Frontier strand of the same school also does not engage in a disciplined 
comparative institutional analysis. It does not analyse the pros and cons of judge-made law, self-regulation and 
market solutions in developing countries but refers only to the disadvantages of public regulation, jumping to the 
conclusion that efficiency requires developing jurisdictions to employ less regulation. In this sense and for a more 
detailed methodological critique of New Comparative Economics, see Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, ‘Toward 
an Institutional Approach to Comparative Economic Law’ in Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt and Joakim 
Nergelius (eds), New Directions in Comparative Law (First edn, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2009). For studies 
from the Legal Origins strand, see Rafael La Porta and others, ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ (1997) 
52 Journal of Finance 1131; Rafael La Porta and others, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of Political 
Economy 1113; Rafael La Porta and others, ‘The Quality of Government’ (1999) 15 Journal of Law, Economics 
and Organization 222; Rafael La Porta and others, ‘Judicial Checks and Balances’ (2004) 112 Journal of Political 
Economy 445. For studies from the Institutional Possibilities Frontier strand, see Simeon Djankov and others, ‘The 
New Comparative Economics’ (2003) 31 Journal of Comparative Economics 595.  
52 Coase regrets that the static framework of neoclassical economics never underwent the transformation 
experienced by evolutionary biology after Darwin, though for his theory he had also drawn inspiration from Adam 
Smith.  Coase, ‘The New Institutional Economics’. 
53 Stefan Grundmann, ‘Transaction Costs and Economic Theory’ in Stefan Grundmann, Hans-W. Micklitz and 
Moritz Renner (eds), Grand Theories of Private Law (forthcoming).  
54 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law; see also Priest; Rubin. 
55 For example, a study based on a data set of 461 US state court appellate decisions, issued from 1970 to 2005 
and involving the economic loss rule in construction disputes, the law did not converge to any stable resting point 
and evolved differently in different states. See Anthony Niblett, Richard Posner and Andrei Shleifer, ‘The 
Evolution of a Legal Rule’ (2010) 39 Journal of Legal Studies 325.  
56 North, Institutions, Institutional Change and  Economic Performance 6. 
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development.57 In contrast with the neoclassical vision which pictures a relentless advancement 
toward a stable efficient equilibrium, New Institutionalists tell a much more sophisticated story 
of change, in which convergence and divergence follow in a complex fashion. While North 
does not deny that some convergence can be observed within the Western industrial world, he 
shows convincingly that, even in this case, national stories of evolution diverge, with the gap 
growing sharply when the analysis is extended beyond these limits.58 He explains the general 
process of convergence as a movement toward efficiency. Yet, he acknowledges 
simultaneously that worldwide inefficient property rights structures abound (with competitive 
pressures not eliminating them) and societies vary greatly in their economic performance. He 
rationalises this puzzling – from the mainstream viewpoint – observation with the constraining 
nature of institutions, which condition organisations' choices, incentivising behaviour that in 
fact perpetuates the existing institutional structure. The way to understand the process of 
institutional stability and change as well as the convergent/divergent evolution of institutions 
across jurisdictions is to retrace the historical context in which national institutional matrixes 
have grown.59  
 
North's observations on convergence and divergence between countries' economic performance 
do not radically differ from the convergence/divergence tendencies perceived by comparative 
lawyers. Rethinking comparative law classifications, more and more often they emphasise the 
so-called Western legal tradition, which, despite the important differences between the 
encompassed common law and civil law jurisdictions, is considered roughly homogeneous.60 
New Institutional Economics forces lawyers to recognise that introducing a new legal solution 
means expending scarce resources and thus does away with any traces of economic nirvana that 
may be left in comparative law.61 But what is more important, by exploring the kind of 
conditions that account for institutional change toward (in)efficiency across time, the historical 
branch of the New Institutional school can greatly enrich comparative research on legal 
transplants.62 This is essential considering that despite having collected abounding evidence on 
                                                 
57 The use of institutional theory by New Comparative Economics is flawed in this respect too. In the studies of 
the Legal Origins strand, legal origin is viewed as exogenous – transplanted through conquest or colonisation. 
Under the assumption that the development of a legal system cannot be linked to a country's political and economic 
environment, legal origin is used as an instrumental variable to test the claim that legal rules systematically affect 
economic performance. The questionable rigid exogeneity of legal systems, the omission of changes in legal rules 
and different legal influences over time make extremely problematic any decisive conclusions about an existing 
consistent causal relationship between the common law/civil law distinction and economic outcomes. In this sense, 
see Simon Deakin, Law and Economic Growth (Presentation, European University Institute March 2011). 
58 North, Institutions, Institutional Change and  Economic Performance 6, 130. 
59 Ibid Preface, 6-7, 73-82. 
60 Mattei 95, 224-226; Pier Giuseppe Monateri, ‘Methods in Comparative Law: an Intellectual Overview’ in Pier 
Giuseppe Monateri (ed), Methods of Comparative Law (First edn, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 
10. 
61 It has been asserted that the positivistic perspective of domestic lawyers is supported by the neoclassical 
economic nirvana, in which consistency of the hierarchical system of legal norms, is achieved without any 
limitations on rationality and transaction costs. Nicita and Pagano; Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio Nicita and Ugo 
Pagano, ‘Law, Economics, and Institutional Complexity. An Introduction’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio Nicita and 
Ugo Pagano (eds), Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions (First edn, London and New York: Routledge 2007) 
1-2. The comparative scholarship on legal irritants and legal fragmentation, however, implies some understanding 
of the constraints, termed by economists as transaction costs and bounded rationality. Günther Teubner, ‘Legal 
Irritants: Good Faith in British Law, or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences’ in Francis Snyder (ed), 
The Europeanisation of Law: the Legal Effects of European Integration (First edn, Oxford: Hart Publishing 2000). 
Yet, to the extent some lawyers still automatically equate borrowing and harmonisation with the introduction of 
the "best" solution, even comparative analysis has not completely broken free from economic nirvana assumptions. 
62 New Comparative Economics is convincingly criticised with respect to the necessary conditions it identified for 
successful legal change. It has been submitted that the effect of transplanted legal solutions is determined to a 
greater extent by the degree of their domestication, achieved in the receiving country, rather than by the legal 
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the occurrence of legal change, comparativists know very little about its causal factors, to which 
they continue to refer only by the vague notion of prestige.63  
 
In examining history, the concepts of path dependency and institutional complementarity 
become crucial for understanding long-run legal and economic change. The increasing returns 
of past institutional choices underpin the evolution of legal institutions and markets on a 
particular path and reversal of direction often comes only through changes in the polity or 
technological shocks.64 From this perspective, the very mode of change (e.g. choice of 
regulation by contract law or by administrative intervention) may be determined by a strong 
path dependency. On one hand, such dependency enables predictions about the probable 
response of a legal system to a new challenge in conditions of continuity; on the other hand, it 
influences the effects generated by a new legal rule in a particular jurisdiction.65 In addition, 
the choice of one type of institutional arrangement in the economic domain makes a fitting 
institution viable in the legal domain and vice versa. Such institutional complementarities 
create the possibility for multiple self-perpetuating equilibria, all of which may be equally 
optimal, but may also result in a Pareto-inferior outcome.66  Therefore, convergence of legal 
systems toward efficiency is possible but in no way guaranteed, and divergences may mean 
inefficiencies but this is not necessarily so.67 Different equally efficient or inefficient 
development trajectories are also feasible. Thus, emphasising the local historical conditions 
and the interdependence between the legal and economic domains, New Institutional 
Economics rejects the universal evolutionary path of law envisaged by the Chicago school. 
Instead, it provides a framework to analyse legal change which allows for a trend of 
convergence but also accounts for the diversity of national laws and for the dissimilar ways 
transplanted legal solutions play out in different legal systems.68  
 
The different analytical procedure (i), the view of the market as not efficient in itself (ii) and 
the development of convincing theory explaining change over time (iii) constitute real 
methodological differences between the Chicago school and New Institutional Economics 
which ultimately translate into a different stance with regard to the concept of efficiency. In 
neoclassical theory efficiency is understood as the ideal solution in the Kaldor-Hicks sense, 
which can be brought about by the free market and with which common law comports. New 
Institutional Economics, on the other hand, does not have such an absolute view of efficiency. 
It is not obsessed with the idea of devising the ideal solution. It rather looks for the second-
best but feasible solution which is to be chosen from the set of identified, functionally 
equivalent alternatives according to the level and types of transaction costs. Transaction costs 
themselves depend on the institutional environment in which the alternative options are 
                                                 
family from which they were borrowed. Daniel Berkowitz, Katarina Pistor and Jean-François Richard, ‘Economic 
Development, Legality and the Transplant Effect’ (2003) 47 European Economic Review 165; Daniel Berkowitz, 
Katarina Pistor and Richard Jean-François, ‘The Transplant Effect’ (2003) 51 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 163. 
63 In this sense, see Alan Watson, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Change’ (1978) 37 Cambridge Law Journal 313, 
320; Mattei 129. 
64 North, Institutions, Institutional Change and  Economic Performance 112. 
65 Ugo Mattei and Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘Comparative Law and Economics’ in Peter Newman (ed), New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol 1 (London: Macmillan Reference 1998) 348-349. 
66 Masahiko Aoki, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis (First edn, Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: 
MIT Press 2001). For a formal definition of institutional complementarity, see Ugo Pagano, ‘Legal Positions and 
Institutional Complementarities’ in Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio Nicita and Ugo Pagano (eds), Legal Orderings and 
Economic Institutions (First edn, London and New York: Routledge 2005) 65-66. 
67 In the same sense, see Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 129, 133-134. 
68 See in this sense Nicita and Pagano. 
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embedded.69 Efficiency, thus, becomes a relative, dynamic notion, not equated with the 
unique, optimal state of the world to which law, in the Chicagoan vision, is bound to converge 
in the long run. Efficiency is contingent on the institutional framework, the latter in turn 
determined by the historical path on which it has evolved.  
 
It is this context-dependent, dynamic concept of efficiency embraced by comparative law and 
economics70 that lays the foundation of refined, empirically relevant economic analysis. Such 
understanding of efficiency implies that for the same legal problem one contract remedy may 
turn out to be efficient in one legal system and inefficient in another or that different contract 
remedies may prove to be equally efficient in different national laws.71 Consequently, with 
regard to any normative recommendations, efficiency is viewed as a category which is to be 
implemented in different ways in the different legal systems.72 Having clarified the choice of 
economic methodology and the controversial issue of efficiency from a theoretical perspective, 
I now turn to the important role of comparative law in the proposed interdisciplinary approach. 
 
C. The Role of Comparative Law 
 
As both New Institutional Economics and comparative law employ the comparative technique 
and the functional method of comparison, they naturally merge in the comparative law and 
economics approach. In the past comparative lawyers have often slipped into merely 
descriptive exercises in which they observe similarities and differences between legal systems 
without providing convincing theoretical explanations for them. From this point of view, 
comparative law can gain from the mature economic framework, providing it with a possibility 
to rationalise better the collected evidence as well as to measure more accurately the common 
core and the dissimilarities between national laws.73 Also, unlike lawyers in the common law 
tradition, who master inductive analysis, economists tend to engage in deductive thinking: on 
the basis of certain assumptions they construct models which they then test against empirical 
data in order to draw conclusions.74 In this sense, legal scholars can benefit from economic 
reasoning which forces them to understand and make explicit their own systemic assumptions 
about law. No doubt, starting from abstract legal norms and overarching principles, civil 
lawyers are accustomed to deductive analysis.75 This, however, does not mean that they are 
proficient in spelling out their premises. On the contrary, largely determined by legal tradition, 
these premises are often taken for granted and thus remain tacit in the reasoning of civil 
lawyers. In addition, the increase in legislation of technical character as well as in the standing 
of the judiciary progressively stimulates inductive legal thinking in civil law jurisdictions. 
Thus, continental legal scholars can also take a lesson from economists in clarifying their 
presuppositions when searching for the correct answer to a problem. 
 
Economic analysis enriches comparative law; yet, the latter's contribution to law and 
economics should also not be underestimated. Comparative law provides abundant empirical 
data, thus enhancing realism in economic analysis. It bears rich knowledge about the legal 
                                                 
69 Oliver Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance (First edn, New York: Oxford University Press 1996). 
70 Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics; Mattei and Cafaggi, ‘Comparative Law and Economics’. 
71 Paraphrased from Mattei and Cafaggi, ‘Comparative Law and Economics’ 347. See in the same sense Mattei, 
Comparative Law and Economics 133-134. 
72 In a similar sense, see Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 22. 
73 In this sense, see Mattei and Cafaggi, ‘Comparative Law and Economics’ 346-347; Mattei, Comparative Law 
and Economics 97, 124-125. 
74 Mercuro and Medema 41-43.  
75 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Introduction to comparative law (Third rev. edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press; 
New York: Oxford University Press 1998) 69. 
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orders integrating the different legal solutions and, hence, of the variables affecting transaction 
costs. Last but not least, comparative law surmounts the difficulties arising from the different 
source-of-law structure in common law and civil law legal systems. 
 
1. Abundant Empirical Material 
 
Comparative law brings in an inexhaustible pool of alternative legal solutions to economic 
problems, making economics less abstract, more engaged with the real world and 
simultaneously more capable of generalising about the working of law, not as local background 
but as universal social phenomenon.76  
 
Opening the door to an abundant variety of existing property rights structures, none of which 
matches the natural law model, comparative law shows the necessity of moving beyond the 
unrealistic template on which mainstream law and economics bases its analysis.77 
Appreciation of the wide range of "jural relations" (rights, liberties, powers, immunities, 
duties, liabilities and disabilities)78 will permit a better understanding of the reasons for which 
legal systems have different combinations of remedies, allow different leeway for judges in 
awarding them and employ a different model (centralised or decentralised) for remedial 
distribution.79  
 
Yet, the merger with comparative law is also about surpassing the wisdom received from New 
Institutional Economics. The economic nirvana of zero transaction costs,80 which New 
Institutionalists manage to overcome, depends on a "legal nirvana",81 sustained by the 
Kelsenian view of law as a united, hierarchical system of legal norms, whose frictionless 
consistency is derived from the authority of one single source.82 This legal nirvana has not yet 
faded away in new institutional research as the latter continues to assume well-defined, 
tradable property rights over all valued attributes of goods and services, for which rights there 
always exists a market and an enforcement system, producing efficient resolution to economic 
conflicts.83 New institutionalist economists simply take the system of setting and enforcing 
property rights as given. In their analysis, the interrelationship between transaction governance 
and law does not affect the level of transaction costs.84 That is why, the conjugation with 
comparative law can be especially insightful. With its interest in many, simultaneously valid 
legal orders comparative law naturally rejects the legal nirvana. In one stroke, it also cures the 
                                                 
76 In this sense, see Mattei and Cafaggi, ‘Comparative Law and Economics’ 346, 348; Mattei, Comparative Law 
and Economics 27-28, 70. 
77 On the natural law misconception of neoclassical law and economics, see supra Section B.2.  
78 Daniel Cole and Peter Grossman, ‘The Meaning of Property "Rights": Law vs. Economics’ (2002) 78 Land 
Economics 317. 
79 Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 58, 63-67. 
80 On the economic nirvana of Chicagoan law and economics, see supra Section B.1. 
81 Nicita and Pagano; Cafaggi, Nicita and Pagano 1-2. The authors convincingly illuminate the way in which the 
economic and the legal nirvana feed and depend on each other. On one hand, the zero-transaction-cost world hinges 
on the assumption of frictionless, consistent legal system, enforced by fully rational actors. On the other hand, the 
positivistic legal vision ignores any constraints resulting from scarcity of resources, bounded rationality, 
transaction costs. See also supra footnote 63. 
82 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (New York: Russel and Russel 1961). 
83 Nicita and Pagano; Cafaggi, Nicita and Pagano 1-2. 
84 For an example of disregarding the influence of law, see Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: 
Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. For the importance of uncovering the relationship between economic 
systems and law, technology, culture, see Coase, ‘The New Institutional Economics’ 74. 
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home country bias, inherited from American legal scholars working in law and economics.85 
The ample variety of legal arrangements brought in by comparative law in a way confirms, on 
one hand, their importance for determining the ex ante and ex post transaction costs and, on 
the other hand, the problem of using one single legal system as a background for drawing 
fundamental conclusions on the effect of legal institutions. 
 
2. Knowledge of the Legal Systems in Which Legal Rules are Embedded 
 
Economic tools can be applied to any legal system and it is a matter of comparative knowledge, 
not of a priori economic impotence, to factor the different legal solutions across jurisdictions 
in the analysis. The functional method86 allows comparativists to pierce the legal systems' 
doctrinal veil, which obstructs understanding of the way legal rules operate. Carried out on the 
basis of factual scenarios, functional comparison ignores the conceptual disparities between 
national laws and identifies the applicable legal rules solving the same problems in each legal 
system. Such a functional exercise enables, for example, detection of similarities and 
differences across jurisdictions regarding the available type of remedy and the calculation of 
damages. It can also penetrate possible differences in legal taxonomies such as contract/tort, 
public/private law in order to analyse the effect of legal rules on individual behaviour. Yet, the 
transaction cost analysis will be impoverished if the work remains at the stage of functional 
comparison and completely disregards the differences in the conceptual frameworks.87 Once 
the legal solutions that are functional substitutes across jurisdictions are identified, the relative 
efficiency of each of them will become clear only by juxtaposing them within the context of 
each of the selected legal systems. At this point the specific taxonomic and conceptual 
structures become important again since they can turn out to be sources of transaction costs 
that have to be taken into consideration.  
 
From this perspective comparative law has accumulated a tremendous amount of knowledge 
that can help in distinguishing the real and false differences between common law and civil 
law countries, between the US and European jurisdictions and between the different systems 
on the Continent. It has much to say about the diverse legal traditions and the possible hurdles 
generated by them that may preclude legal change in the direction of efficiency.88 Translated 
in economic terminology such hurdles constitute ex ante transaction costs in the definition of 
property rights, an issue on which economic analysis has made very little progress.89 
Comparative law can also explain the reasons for which functionally equivalent legal solutions 
may prove to be grounded in contract in one legal system and in tort in another. It can 
illuminate the diverse allocation of institutional roles across jurisdictions and thus justify the 
different weight attributed to private law and public law devices. The different nature of the 
legal arrangements and the transaction costs imposed by legal tradition may suggest a 
                                                 
85 On the home country bias, see supra the text accompanying footnote 41 in Section B.2. Instead of correcting 
this bias, legal scholars, who introduced law and economics in Europe, supported it by not making any adjustments 
to the particular legal context. On the need to do away with legal positivism in law and economics, see Mattei, 
Comparative Law and Economics Chapter 3 The Distinction between Common Law and Civil Law: Doing Away 
with Legal Positivism 69-99.  
86 Zweigert and Kötz 34. 
87 For arguments in favour of purposes and concepts going hand in hand in the comparison of legal rules, see also 
James Gordley, ‘The Functional Method’ in Pier Giuseppe Monateri (ed), Methods of Comparative Law (First 
edn, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 110-114. In reality, despite the good results the functional 
method produces, more often than not, comparative legal scholars supplement it with another approach (historical, 
philosophical, etc.) depending on the focus of their research. Vernon Valentine Palmer, ‘From Lerotholi to Lando: 
Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology’ (2004) 4 Global Jurist Frontiers 1, 23-24.  
88 Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 77, 141. 
89 In this sense, see Cafaggi, Nicita and Pagano 6. 
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modification within the existing legal solution without changing its assignment between 
different areas (contract or tort, private or public law).90 Comparative research also implies 
that the development of a legal system may strongly depend on the degree of influence of the 
professional groups framing the law in the different legal contexts. Hence, determined by 
factors such as power and authority, the evolution of the legal system may not necessarily 
entail cuts in transaction costs.91 All these are matters which must be investigated on a case-
by-case basis. However, what needs to be emphasised at this stage is that methodologically 
comparative law has a great deal of experience in the deconstruction of the declared legal rules 
as well as in the deep-level examination of the context-dependent conceptual framework.92 
Both are vital for making a sound economic analysis. 
  
3. Bridging Source-of-Law Differences 
 
While enabling economic analysis to account for local particularities, comparative law is also 
able to bridge the common law/civil law divide where the latter is irrelevant for law and 
economics. Nowhere is this more evident than in the question of the sources of law recognised 
in common law and civil law jurisdictions. 
 
According to traditional accounts, the source-of-law structure is a key difference between 
common law and civil law systems: the former mostly based on judge-made law, applied 
according to the rule of precedent, while the latter - grounded on statutory law, interpreted by 
courts. On the face, this raises a problem – where law and economics focuses predominantly 
on case-law, the analysis can be a priori attacked as unconvincing. After all, even if having 
some influence in legal reality, case-law in civil law systems is not setting out binding legal 
rules. Thus, the absence of a rule of precedent gives rise to concerns over whether the economic 
approach is at all fit to be applied to civil law. Clearly such a view is the legacy of the positivist 
conceptions of law, ignoring the latest achievements of comparative law methodology.93  
 
Inherently anti-positivist in nature, comparative law has long passed the point of juxtaposing 
only the legislative texts of European continental legal systems, struggling with the 
phenomenon of uncodified common law. The focus on law in action has opened new lines of 
enquiry revealing that the similarities between the two legal traditions are more than previously 
presumed. Comparativists continuously emphasise that throughout the 20th century the 
common law/civil law differences in the source-of-law structure have been softened with the 
two legal traditions experiencing a process of convergence. It has long been maintained that 
common law courts live in "the age of statutes",94 while legislators in civil law jurisdictions 
face the reality of increasing case-law impact on the legal system. The role of civil law judges 
is hardly exhausted with being the "mouthpiece of statutory law", as appealed by Montesquieu. 
Rather, they have their own lawmaking contributions. Examples can be put forward not only 
from the jurisdictions that have supplied the grand civil codes (France and Germany) as is 
usually done, but also from less known civil law countries as Bulgaria. Bulgarian courts have 
developed important issues of the regime of damages for breach of contract, of the contract for 
the benefit of third parties, the contract for transfer of property in exchange of care and 
                                                 
90 Mattei and Cafaggi, ‘Comparative Law and Economics’ 348; Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 74. 
91 Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 120-121. 
92 On the formants approach in comparative law, which emphasises the clash between stated and operational rules 
as well as the importance of the legal discourse, see Monateri 22-24. 
93 In this sense, see Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 69-99. 
94 Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (First edn, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press 1982); Patrick Atiyah, ‘Common Law and Statute Law’ (1985) 48 Modern Law Review 1. 
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maintenance. The court decisions in the area of preliminary contracts have even prompted 
amendments to the relevant statutory provisions.95 But even where case-law has not led to 
statutory amendments, civil law judges participate in lawmaking. Undoubtedly, in all civil law 
systems the broad standards, used abundantly in the legislative acts (“the reasonable man, 
etc.”), actually increase the importance of case-law, as judges are charged with the task of 
giving these broad concepts a concrete meaning. And where civil codes cannot keep pace with 
modern life, judges fill the gaps adapting the law to contemporary reality and thus carrying it 
a step further. All the amassed comparative experience shows that the differences with regard 
to the source-of-law structure between civil law and common law are exaggerated and do not 
preclude economic analysis. 
 
Yet, when tackling the different structure of sources of law, comparative law does not stop 
with the identification of the trend of convergence between civil law and common law systems. 
Acknowledging the changing social reality and in an effort to capture law in action, the most 
recent comparative theory maintains that a specific legal rule cannot be ascertained by solely 
consulting the source of law (legislation or case-law), endorsed by the national definition of 
the term. A legal rule is rather a product of the interaction of different "legal formants" (court 
decisions, legislative acts, scholarly works), each of which contributes to shaping the rule.96 
Thus, finding the rule requires consultation of many different texts, written by different 
suppliers of law, which may very well contradict and challenge each other. The role of the 
comparative lawyer then is, by analysing all these texts, to discover not the rule in force, but 
the true operational rule in the legal system as well as the various factors and influences that 
led to it. Resolving in this way the puzzle with the different source-of-law structure, 
comparative law not only manages to overcome the gap between common law and civil law 
systems and to establish itself as one of the most promising legal disciplines. It also makes it 
possible to perform an economic analysis which accounts for the dissimilarities between the 
different legal traditions and simultaneously bridges them in order to examine them from a 
common perspective.97 
 
In other words, just like neoclassical economics is not the mandatory branch of economics to 
be used, American law (or another common law legal system) does not constitute an obligatory 
background for economic research. Bringing with it ample empirical material and accrued 
knowledge of different institutional environments, it opens the economic perspective to the 
peculiarities of various national contexts. At the same time refuting the natural law and positive 
law assumptions that still underlie economic theory and solving concrete methodological 
problems (as in the source-of-law example), comparative law aids law and economics in its 
universalistic efforts. 
 
The final requirement for a good method for doing law and economics is for reciprocity. 
Adding the insights from another discipline – economics – opens new horizons to legal 
research and infuses it with new analytical energy. Yet, true interdisciplinarity cannot be 
achieved where economics (as in the case of Neoclassical Economics) subjugates law and 
                                                 
95 Krasen Stoychev, ‘Contracts. Bulgaria’ in Roger Blanpain, Michele Colucci and Jacques Herbots (eds), 
International Encyclopaedia of Laws, vol I (First edn, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 1999) 12. 
96 Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law’ (1991) 39 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 343. Legal formants may also be referred to in terms of professional communities who are 
engaged in shaping the law (judges, legislators, professors). John Dawson, The Oracles of the Law (Second edn, 
Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press 1978); Raoul van Caenegem, Judges, Legislators, and Professors: 
Chapters in European Legal History (First edn, Cambridge (Cambridgeshire); New York: Cambridge University 
Press 1987); Monateri.  
97 Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics 70-71. 
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treats it only as an object of research without allowing for the deep internal links between the 
two disciplines. Interdisciplinary interaction makes sense only if the approaches are combined 
in a way to enhance each other and create a new method of increased power and insight. On 
this account, comparative institutional law and economics is a remarkably promising marriage 
between two methodologies of two different disciplines. Both inherently comparative and 
historical, New Institutional Economics and comparative law naturally complement each 
other, curing each other's weaknesses. In the resulting rich framework, efficiency ceases to be 
a universal benchmark to which all legal systems are measured against and acquires meaning 
only within the institutional environment of a particular jurisdiction. Capable of such deep-
level studying of national legal systems, comparative law and economics can then produce a 
unifying theory of law as a universal social phenomenon. It is only regrettable that until now 
this new interdisciplinary field has not been fully explored. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper I claim to have made several contributions. The first is a modest one – it exposes 
to the legal audience of this journal the availability of a different kind of economics, one that is 
not so common yet that it is sufficiently well-developed to make important contributions to the 
analysis of a number of legal phenomena. More importantly, it was shown that New 
Institutional Economics does not suffer from the shortcomings of the neoclassical approach that 
make the latter unpalatable for many lawyers. The more ambitious contribution is to propose a 
development of the NIE method. I have shown that while NIE represents an improved 
alternative to neoclassical economics, by itself it is not epistemically satisfactory either. Its own 
limitations, however, do not make it redundant when applied to law. On the contrary, I have 
shown that it is a natural partner to Comparative Law – an approach which is well-established 
in legal scholarship. NIE can form an equal partnership with Comparative law – Comparative 
Institutional Law and Economics as I called it – which promises to be very fruitful both for 
economics and for law. This will be especially valuable for those of us who want to study law 
in the full richness of its social context. While Socio-Legal Studies are increasingly popular in 
the academia, the economics is conspicuously absent from this ‘socio’, as if economics were 
not a social science. Thus, the furthest reaching goal of this paper is not only to show a proper 
way to do law and economics, but also to put economics back on the broad palette of socio-
legal scholarship. The final contribution which I claim is to have rescued the concept of 
efficiency from the grip of neoclassical economics. Instead of the universal yardstick that 
enables the economists to pass judgements on rules, institutions and legal systems that they 
rarely bother to fully understand, comparative institutional law and economics uses a concept 
that is dependent on the context. While it allows meaningful comparisons between different 
institutions within jurisdiction, or between alternative institutions across jurisdictions, it 
eschews the urge to rank them according to their proximity to a Platonic ideal type.  
 
